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APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Appellant LCI Enterprises submits the following Reply Brief (i) to
demonstrate the lack of merit in Respondent's argument that summary judgment was
in fact appropriate; (ii) to address the appropriate test to determine whether
Respondents are third-party beneficiaries of the lease at issue; and (iii) to address
Respondent's allegations that Plaintiff has raised new issues on appeal that were not
raised in the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are summarized in the Statement of Facts
presented in Appellant's original Brief. In lieu of a repetitious recitation of those
facts, Appellant refers this Court to that original Statement of Facts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I; THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE LEASE MANDATES A REVERSAL
OF THE LOWER COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Respondents appear to argue that because they concede the facts
alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot argue that the case is not ripe for summary
judgment. The plain language of the clause at issue does not justify a summary
judgment for Respondents. As set forth in Point I of Appellant's Brief, the plain
language of the subrogation waiver clause clearly states that those protected, z.e.,
"representatives, successors, heirs, administrators, and assigns," are protected not only
from their own negligence, but from vicarious liability arising out of the negligence
of their agents and employees. To construe the clause otherwise, in a manner
contrary to its plain language, as Respondents urge and as the lower court did,
requires consideration of facts not before the lower court.
There is no ambiguity in the language itself with regard to the
applicability of the clause in the context before the Court. Ambiguity, if it is found,
as Respondents urge, is with regard to the breadth of the scope of the nature of the
acts to which the clause applies. For example, does it apply to intentional or
reckless acts of parties or their successors, or is it limited to negligent acts? Here,
there is admitted ambiguity, and the Court must look to the intent of the parties.
However, neither party has introduced any evidence with regard to the parties'
intent.
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Respondents further seem to argue in Point I of their Brief that this
Court should look only to the lease agreement and not to all the relevant facts
before the Court. In evaluating the correctness of the lower court's ruling, this
Court must review all the facts available to the lower court to enable it to determine
whether a factual dispute precludes summary judgment and to evaluate whether the
law was correctly applied to the undisputed facts. Respondents' argument misses the
focus of a summary judgment proceeding.
Respondents urge, quite convincingly, in Point III of their Brief that
the purpose of a subrogation waiver clause is "to help the parties avoid continuing
dispute and litigation." (Resp. Br. at 8, emphasis added.) Here, Appellant can agree
with Respondents.

Appellant and the Theatre Candy Distributing corporation

wanted no part of involvement in claims against one another. However, they did not
waive claims against third persons not parties to the agreement. The plain language
of the lease mandates reversal of the lower court's award of summary judgment.
Before a contract can be construed beyond its plain language, an ambiguity must be
found. Ambiguity can be found only by analyzing the intent of the parties; yet there
is no evidence before the Court on the issue of the Lessor and Lessees' intent.
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Respondents was not appropriate.
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POINT II: SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IF BASED UPON RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS
THAT THEY ARE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES TO THE LEASE AT ISSUE,
IS UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE.
Respondents state in a conclusory manner in Point V of their Brief
that they are third-party beneficiaries of the lease between Appellant and the
Theatre Candy Distributing corporation. There is no evidence that the parties to the
lease intended Respondents to hold a third-party beneficiary status.
This Court very recently discussed the law pertaining to third-party
beneficiary contracts in Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 74 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44 (Ct. App. Utah 1988). There, the vendors of real property sought to enforce
their contract with the purchasers not only against the purchasers but against all
successors in interest. The plaintiff vendors argued that the successors in interest
were third-party beneficiaries under the contract and therefore liable. This Court
stated:
As a general rule, the rights of third-party beneficiaries
are determined by the intentions of the parties to the
subject contract.

For a third-party beneficiary to have a right to enforce
a right, the intention of the contracting parties to confer
a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must
be clear.
748 P.2d at 1104-05 (citations omitted.) This Court recognized that those individuals

only incidentally benefitting fwm the contract are not entitled to enforce it. Quoting
from 2 S. Williston, A Treatise On the Law of Contracts, §356 (1981), this Court
noted:
[Wjhere any benefits to a third person are incidental to
the performance of the promise and such person is
neither a donee nor a creditor beneficiary, he is a
stranger to the promise and may assert no rights
thereunder.
748 P.2d at 1105. In the present case, there was no evidence before the lower court
that the parties intended Respondents to be third-party beneficiaries of the lease
agreement and Respondents' claims that they are third-party beneficiaries have no
merit. The lower court's summary judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained on the
basis of a third-party beneficiary theory and must be reversed.

POINTIIl; APPELLANT HAS RAISED NO NEW ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
ON APPEAL.
Respondents argue in Point VII of Respondents' Brief that new
issues are raised by Appellant on appeal. (Resp. Br. at 19.) This argument is
without

merit.

Both

in

their

Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Defendants/Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and at the hearing on
that Motion, Plaintiff/Appellant vigorously argued the plain language of the lease
agreement as well as the nature of Respondents' behavior. That is the focus of this
appeal and it was the focus of the argument in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. Respondents' argument is not well taken.

5

I

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in construing the subrogation waiver provision
of the lease beyond the plain language of the clause. There is no indication that the

i
i

parties to the agreement intended to confer a benefit on Respondents and summary
judgment was inappropriate. The factual and legal issues raised by this appeal were
available to the trial court for its review. The lower court erred in its finding that

\

Respondents fell within the protection of the subrogation waiver clause and,
accordingly, the summary judgment granted by the lower court must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H ^ d a y of November, 1988.
PARKEN & KECK

By \(kuJiJLk^
Marcella L. Keck
Counsel for Appellant
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